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DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES IN FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH AND
SAFETY LITIGATION-THOUGHTS
ON VARYING JUDICIAL APPLICATION
OF THE RULE
DONALD

W. STEVER, JR.·

Early on in the argument of virtually every brief filed on behalf
of a government agency whose administrative action is being chal
lenged, one will find an assertion that reviewing courts owe defer
ence to the agency. I This notion actually embodies four concepts:
a) deference to an agency's interpretation of its statutes;2
b) deference to an agency's construction of its own regulations
("even more deference");3 c) deference to judgments about matters
of a complex technical or scientific nature within the agency's area of
expertise;4 and d) deference to an agency's basic fact-finding. 5
The deference rule has been the subject of significant debate in
recent years, and is among one of the major issues in "regulatory
• Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; J.D., University of Penn
sylvania Law School, 1968; B.A., Lehigh University, 1965; Former Chief, Pollution Con
trol and Environmental Defense sections, United States Department of Justice, 1978-82;
author of SEABROOK AND THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION; author of casebook
on Chemical Regulation, to be published by Associated Faculty Press; author of treatise
on the Law of Chemical Regulation, to be published by Clark, Boardman & Co.
I. During the time the author was chief of the Pollution Control and Environmen
tal Defense sections of the Justice Department's Land and Natural Resources Division,
he reviewed hundreds of appellate briefs written by agency attorneys and members of his
staff. The "deference" assertion was literally considered mandatory boilerplate.
2. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. I, 16 (1965).
3. Montana Power Co. v. EPA, 608 F.2d 334, 345 (9th Cir. 1979) (relying on Udall
v. Tallman, 380 U.S. I (1965». The Supreme Court, in Udall, used words of arguably
different import. The Court, in discussing deference as to statutory and regulatory inter- .
pretation, stated that deference as to the latter "is even more clearly in order." 380 U.S.
at 16.
4. See Lead Industries Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1145-46 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see
also, Citizens Against Refinery's Effects v. EPA, 643 F.2d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1981).
5. See, e.g., Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1983).
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reform" platforms. 6 Critics argue that the rule gives agencies too
much power, and makes meaningful judicial review impossible. 7 In
its most extreme form, this criticism is grounded upon a notion that
Congress should delegate powers to administrative agencies with
greater specificity, and that organic statutes that allow extreme
agency latitude should be held unconstitutiona1. 8 Other critics quar
rel with the notion that those in positions of power are presumed to
be correct and argue that the presumption should cut the other way.9
The recent debate over the judicial acquiescence to agency
ru1emaking or the judicial policy of deference has illustrated that
there is a substantial degree of confusion over its origins, scope and
application. Indeed, the federal courts of appeals, whose decisions
apply and presumably delimit the scope of the deference rule, have
applied the rule erratically. One function of this article is to examine
varying judicial use cif the deference rule. Another is to determine
whether deference to agency expertise has a significant impact on the
outcome of regulatory litigation.
I.

ORIGIN OF THE DEFERENCE DOCTRINE

Judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of the language
of statutes it administers appears to have evolved without any statu
tory basis during the 1940's, out of cases involving disputes arising
under section 2 of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act. \0 To
6. Eg., S. REP. No. 284, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 165 (1981) [hereinafter Senate Judi
ciary Committee Report]. "We wish to make clear our disapproval of this doctrine and
our intent that the courts not presume that the agencies are correct in their interpretations
of the law, whether derived from the Constitution, the organic statutes and implementing
regulations, procedural statutes ... or federal common law where it exists." Id.
7. Id. at 165.
8. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 675 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (§ 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.c. § 655(b)(5) (1976), violates "the doctrine against uncanal
ized delegation of legislative power. ").
9. Schwartz, 0/ Administrators and Philosopher-Kings: The Republic, The Laws,
and Delegations 0/ Power, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 443, 450 (1977).
10. Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 2,49 Stat. 449,450 (1970) (current version at 29 U.S.c.
§ 152 (1976 & Supp. V 1981» [hereinafter Wagner Act]; see, e.g., Office and Professional
Employees Int'I Union Local 425 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1969). There is no
evidence, for example, that the development of the doctrine was related to the concept
"arbitrary and capricious" scope of review as opposed to the "substantial evidence"
scope of review, set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.c. 706 (2)(A),(E)
(1982) [hereinafter APA]. As will be shown, the deference rule rests on language con
tained in decisions of the Supreme Court that predate the AP A. See infra text accompa
nying notes 11-41. While one might find it interesting to explore what difference really
exists between the "arbitrary and capricious" and "substantial evidence" standards as
each has been applied, see, e.g. , Superior Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
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the extent one decision can be identified as seminal, it is probably
Justice Rutledge's opinion in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. II
The Court was faced with the question of whether newsboys were
"employees" and thus their employer bound to bargain with their
chosen representative. The Wagner Act did not specifically define
the term. 12 Hearst argued that, in the absence of a statutory defini
tion, the Court should define the term independently by reference to
the common law distinction between employees and independent
contractors. 13 In rejecting this argument, the Court pointed out that
the National Labor Relations Board, the agency responsible for ad
ministering the NLRA, develops a familiarity with the factual reali
ties of employer-employee relationships in the ordinary course of its
administrative routine, and concluded that since Congress entrusted
fact-finding to the Board, the Court should not "substitute its own
inferences of fact for the Board's, when the latter have support in the
record." 14
With respect to the interpretation of a statute, the Court ac
knowledged that such questions are ultimately for the courts to de
cide, "giving appropriate weight" to the agency's judgment. 15 The
Court went on to state, however, that "where the question is one of
specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in
which the agency administering the statute must determine it ini
tially, the reviewing court's function is limited," the agency's deter
mination will be accepted if it has "'warrant in the record' and a
reasonable basis in law."16
It is not clear, though, that the Supreme Court in Hearst actu
ally decided the issue before it by means of according deference to
the Board. The Court's deference analysis takes place after it has
already concluded that Congress had not intended to restrict the
scope of the term "employee" to the vagaries of state common law,
and in addition, that Hearst's newsboys were the object of the evils
563 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1977), I have chosen not to embark upon such an adventure. I am,
here, concerned with the concept of deference generally. Most of the cases in which
deference is relied upon involve informal rulemaking, and are thus reviewed under the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. See generally Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v.
Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
II. 322 U.S. III (1944).
12. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 2, 61
Stat. 136, 137 (codified at 29 U.S.c. § 152(2) (1982» [hereinafter NLRA], amended the
Wagner Act, see supra note 10, to provide a more complete definition.
13. 322 U.S. at 120.
14. /d. at 130.
15. /d. at 130-31.
16. /d. at 131.
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Congress sought to address in the Wagner Act. 17 Viewed in light of
the syntax of the opinion, the Court's reliance on deference to the
agency appears to be only a supporting argument-as if to say, "we
disagree with the plaintiffs urgings, as we read the statute and, by
the way, the Board's position is not inconsistent with our view."18
The Court seemed quite willing to accord administrative agen
cies the same degree of deference normally accorded jury findings
when it stated that courts must not "substitute their own inferences
of fact."19 That the Court in Hearst accorded the same degree of
deference to the Board's interpretation of the statute under which it
had acted is much less clear.
In stating that courts should give "appropriate weight" to the
judgment of administrative agencies, the Court relied on Norwegian
Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States. 20 Norwegian Nitrogen in
volved a dispute over whether, under the Tariff Act of 1922,21 the
United States Tariff Commission was required to hold a public hear
ing prior to taking certain actions that affected the plaintiff. The
Court's opinion, authored by Justice Cardozo, upheld the Commis
sion's procedures partly on the basis of Congress's apparent acquies
cence to the Commission's longstanding administrative practice of
not providing hearings. 22 Rather than elevate administrative prac
tice to a position of special or peculiar reliance, the Court considered
it as an aid to the Court's own construction of the statute, to be con
17. Id at 120-32.
18. This view is supported by the sentence leading in to its deference discussion.
After concluding that Hearst's newsboys ought to be entitled to wage and hour protec
tion, the Court said: "It is not necessary in this case to make a completely definitive
limitation around the term 'employee.' That task has been assigned primarily to the
agency. . . ." 322 U.S. at 130.
19. Id. The Court muddied the water somewhat 27 years later when in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), it stated that a reviewing court
must consider "whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Id. at 416. For an
amusing commentary on this point see Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,34 n.74 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
20. 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
21. Pub. L. No. 67-318, § 315,42 Stat. 858, 941-93 (1922) (repealed 1930).
22. 288 U.S. at 313-16. The court said:
True indeed it is that administrative practice does not avail to overcome a stat
ute so plain in its commands as to leave nothing for construction. True it also is
that administrative practice, consistent and generally unchallenged, will not be
overturned except for very cogent reasons if the scope of the command is indefi
nite and doubtful. The practice has peculiar weight when it involves a contem
poraneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility
of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and
smoothly while they are yet untried and new.
Id. at 315 (citations omitted).
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sidered concurrently with other "external aids that are drawn from
history and analogy"23 and the "internal [aid] to be derived from the
wording of related sections."24
The Hearst Court concluded its deference analysis with the
statement that "where the question is one of specific application of a
broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency adminis
tering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's
function is limited."25 This is arguably little more than another way
of saying that in applying the law to the facts, review of the fact
finder's determination is not de novo. 26
Shortly after Hearst, the Court placed what has come to be a
significant gloss on the Hearst opinion's deference language. In Un
employment Compensation Commission of Alaska v. Aragon ,27 the
Court cited the Hearst Court's statement that a reviewing court's
function is limited, and that all that is needed to support an agency is
that its interpretations have" 'warrant in the record'" and a "rea
sonable basis in law."28 Nonetheless, the Court opined that "to sus
tain the Commission's application of ... [a broad statutory term to
a set of facts], we need not find that its construction is the only rea
sonable one, or even that it is the result we would have reached had
the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings."29
Although the language is couched in terms of statutory interpre
tation, the Court inAragon was actually reviewing the Commission's
finding that a given set of facts constituted a labor dispute "in active
process," for the purpose of determining whether a discharged em
ployee was entitled to unemployment compensation under the
Alaska Act. 30 The term "labor dispute" was not defined in the stat
ute. As it did in Hearst, the Court first concluded, on its own, that
the plaintiff's proffered narrow definition of "labor dispute" was not
tenable in light of the purposes to be served by the statute. 31 Only
23. Id.
Id.; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). (The court
should evaluate "the thoroughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency. . . .").
25. 322 U.S. at 131.
26. Justice Roberts, who authored the dissenting opinion, apparently read more
into the statement, however: "It is urged that the Act uses the term ["employee"] in some
loose and unusual sense such as justifies the Board's decision. . . ." Id. at 136 (Roberts,
J., dissenting).
27. 329 U.S. 143 (1946).
28. Id. at 154 (citing NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. III (1944».
29. Id. at 153.
30. Id. at 149-50.
31. /d. at 150-51.
24.
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then did it discuss the Commission's finding that a labor dispute (as
broadly construed without reference to deference) was "in active
progress" at the time the employee was discharged. This, despite the
breadth of the Court's language, was fact-finding (or at most a mixed
question of law and fact, tending toward fact), and according defer
ence to an administrative fact-finder is based on a different legal
footing than acceding to an agency's construction of the law.32
To the extent the Court, in these early decisions, gave respect or
weight to administrative construction, it was in connection with the
agency's "practical administrative construction of a disputed provi
sion."33 It was a narrow sort of respect, the type normally expected
to be accorded a person who works daily in an area and is accus
tomed to applying generalized statutory directives to various factual
situations. 34
Evolution of the deference concept to its current formulation
began with dictum contained in Udall v. Tallman .35 The case in
volved a dispute over the proper construction of an interim Interior
Department regulation,36 and whether a certain administrative order
constituted a violation of another regulation of the same agency.37
As to that issue, the Court quite understandably stated that it would
accord great weight to the Agency's past practice in identical situa
tions. 38 If it finds a consistent pattern of action, the Court stated it
will uphold the challenged construction. 39
In prefacing its discussion of the issue before it, however, the
Court uttered the now oft-cited dictum: "When faced with a prob
lem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the
interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged
with its administration."40 The Court based this assertion on the
Aragon case and on an apparent misreading of Justice Cardozo's
language from Norwegian Nitrogen .41 Justice Cardozo was giving a
32. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
33. Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Electrical Radio and
Machine Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961).
34. See id.
35. 380 U.S. I (1965).
36. The precise issue involved in Udall was whether Public Land Order No. 487,
which withdrew certain Alaska lands from availability for settlement, also served to pre
vent the Secretary of Interior from issuing oil and gas leases covering the withdrawn
lands. /d.
37. Id.
38. Id.at 17-18.
39. Id.
40. /d. at 16 (emphasis added).
41. Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion in Udall also misattributes Cardozo's
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slight degree of deference to longstanding administrative practices
unchanged by successive sessions of Congress.
The reason for such deference is straightforward. The Court
presumes Congress to be aware of longstanding administrative inter
pretation and would act to change the wording of the statute if it
disagreed. The argument for such deference increases in strength
each time the statute is amended without change in the provision at
issue.
The Udall dictum is unbridled by these limitations. It would
accord the same degree of deference to a new agency's interpretation
of a new statute as would be accorded to longstanding interpretation.
Subsequent reliance on the Udall dictum,42 is further suspect be
cause its broad pronouncement was not necessary to the result
reached by the Court on the merits of the case which, as discussed
above, could have been decided (and no doubt was decided) on the
more limited deference principles articulated in Norwegian Nitrogen.

II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEFERENCE RULE SUBSEQUENT TO
UDALL V. TALLMAN

From Udall, the deference rule has grown in the manner of
branches on a tree as the courts of appeals had applied it using
sometimes vastly different criteria. Each of the forms of deference
to agency fact-finding, statutory interpretation, and regulatory inter
pretation43 -have been applied at times with identical standards,
and at times quite differently. One new form of deference, to scien
tific and technical judgment, is a recent innovation and has
prompted lively debate over its application. 44
Before examining the development and parameters of each type
of deference, something must be said about the significance of the
provisions of section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)45 on the development of the deference concept generally.
Section 10 makes all agency action subject to scrutiny as to whether
it is "contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immu
nity,"46 "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations,
language in Justice Brennan's opinion in Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union
of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, 367 U.S. 396,408 (1961).
42. See infra notes 43-65 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 1-5.
44. See infra notes 97-132 and accompanying text.
45. 5 U.S.c. § 706(2)(A)-(F) (1982).
46. Id. § 706(2)(B).
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or short of statutory right,"47 or "without observance of procedure
required by law."48 Only the second of these provides guidance for
court review of an agency's statutory interpretation. 49
The factual determinations made in agency adjudications are
subject to review under the "substantial evidence" standard. 50 A
comparatively small number of actions fall into this category and
even fewer are subject to de novo review. 51 The vast majority of
agency informal rulemaking actions are, as to the agency's fact-find
ing, reviewable under a standard that requires affirmance unless the
actions are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other
wise not in accordance with law."52
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard is frequently stated to
include a presumption that agency action is valid. 53 Nothing in the
APA or its legislative history, however, points to such a presump
tion. 54 The source usually relied upon for the presumption is a pro
nouncement in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe 55 that
administrative decisions are entitled to "a presumption of regular
ity."56 It is not at all certain, however, that the Supreme Court had
in mind a presumption of substantive correctness, or of general va
lidity, when it used the term "regularity," or whether it intended to
link the presumption to any statutory command of the AP A.
The Court's entire paragraph, from which the usual quotation is
extracted, is as follows:
Even though there is no de novo review [under 5 U.S.c.
§ 706(2)(F)(l982)] in this case and the Secretary's approval . . .
does not have ultimately to meet the substantial-evidence test, the
generally applicable standards of § 706 require the reviewing
court to engage in a substantial inquiry. Certainly, the Secretary's
47. Id. § 706(2)(C).
48. /d. § 706(2)(0).
49. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,34 n.71 (O.c. Cir. 1976).
50. 5 U.S.c. § 706(2)(E) (1982); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971).
51. 5 U.S.c. § 706(2)(F) (1982); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
52. 5 U.S.c. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
53. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I, 34 (O.c. Cir. 1976) (en bane), cerl.
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. V. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402,415 (1971); National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. V. C.A.B., 618 F.2d
819,826 (1980).
54. See generally H. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1946 U.S.
CODE CONGo SERVo 1195-1206.
55. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
56. Id. at 415.
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decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity. But that pre
sumption is not to shield his action from a thorough, probing, in
depth review. 57

Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 58 on which the Overton
Park Court rested its "presumption of regularity" language, 59 pre
dates the APA by eleven years. Pacific States involved a suit to en
join enforcement of an order by a state agriculture department
requiring fruits to be sold in certain sized containers. The plaintiff
challenged the order in federal district court on a number of
grounds, among which were the federal pre-emption, the imposition
of an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce, and that the or
der was not properly within the scope of the police power. 60 Proce
durally, the case was before the Supreme Court on appeal of the
grant of a motion to dismiss before tria1. 61 The plaintiff argued that
it was an error for the Iowa court to dismiss its complaint on the
police power ground, since it had pled facts that, when construed in
the light most favorable to the complaint, made out a prima facie
case. 62 The Court first stated that, when legislative action, generally
within the police power, is challenged, the courts will presume the
existence of facts sufficient to support the legislative action, thereby
requiring a plaintiff to do more than plead in a conclusory manner. 63
The Court was responding to the plaintiffs argument that an admin
istrative order should be entitled to less deference than a legislative
act. 64 Thus, the statement later relied on in Overton Park was a
57. Id. (citations omitted).
58. 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
59. 401 U.S. at 415.
60. 296 U.S. at 180-85.
61. Id. at 185.
62. Id. at 184.
63. Id. at 185. The Court stated that the plaintiff must "carry the burden of show
ing by a resort to common knowledge or other matters which may be judicially noticed,
or to other legitimate proof that the action is arbitrary." Id. (quoting Borden's Farm
Products v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194,209 (1934».
64. Id. at 185-86. The Court's language is worth quoting in its entirety:
Every exertion of the police power, either by the legislature or by an adminis
trative body, is an exercise of delegated power. Where it is by a statute, the
Legislature has acted under power delegated to it through the Constitution.
Where the regulation is by an order of an administrative body. that body acts
under a delegation from the Legislature. . . . [W)here the regulation is within
the scope of authority legally delegated, the presumption of the existence of
facts justifying its specific exercise attaches alike to statutes, to municipal ordi
nances, and to orders of administrative bodies. Compare Aetna Insurance Co.
v. Hyde, 275 U.S. 440 (1928).
296 U.S. at 185-86. The Court's reference to the Aetna case reinforces a narrow reading
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limited one. The "presumption" relates not to the legal or factual
support for the challenged action per se, but only to the extent that,
in the context of civil litigation brought against a governmental en
tity, the plaintiffs unsupported allegations of error are not enough.
The Court in Pac!fic States was not concerned with substantive
review of an administrative rule under a statute providing for judi
cial review. It was simply articulating the threshold presumption of
validity of state action when subjected to constitutional challenge.
In restating the Pac!fic States doctrine in Overton Park, the Court
was arguably saying only that it will presume the agency acted
within the scope of its delegated power, and require the plaintiff to
carry the vital burden of persuasion. Overton Park did, after all,
arise in the district court, and it would seem a great change in the
law for the Court to apply the usual burden to it. Indeed, when
viewed in its entirety, the "presumption" language quoted from
Overton Park seems more consistent with an absence of deference to
any significant degree, as a matter of statutory law, than with the
proposition for which the language is usually cited, namely that
§ 706(2)(F) requires the judiciary to presume substantive correctness
in reviewing administrative decisions.
That the degree of deference accorded an agency is a product of
judgment rather than statutory law is underscored by the fact that
the courts of appeals have generally tended to treat "substantial evi
dence" and "arbitrary and capricious" cases in a similar manner,
from the standpoint of according deference to an agency's fact
gathering. 65
of what it intended. Aetna was another case in which the issue was whether the plaintiff
pled its complaint specifically enough to withstand a motion to dismiss its constitutional
claims.
65. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,36 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also Senate Judiciary
Committee Report, supra note 6, at 165-66.
The best attempt at drawing a distinction between these two standards is found in
Ethyl where the court stated:
[Despite the fact] that in reviewing the evidence relied upon in agency proceed
ings, the two standards often seem to merge. The primary difference between
the two in such cases would seem to be that "substantial evidence" review is
limited to evidence developed in formal hearings, while "arbitrary and capri
cious" review of an agency engaged in informal rule-making is not so limited,
but rather may consider the agency's developed expertise and any evidence ref
erenced by the agency or otherwise placed in the record.
541 F.2d at 37 n.79 (citations omitted).
This analysis is not, however, totally persuasive. Is it not, for example, the case that
an agency applies its "developed expertise" to the facts following an adjudication to the
same degree it applies its expertise in formulating a rule? In addition, one should expect
the Environmental Protection Agency to apply its "developed expertise" to the facts in
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DEFERENCE TO AGENCY FACT-FINDING

Concluding that there is no firm statutory basis in the APA for
according agency actions presumptive validity does not, however,
end the inquiry. The lower federal courts and, indeed, the Supreme
Court on occasion,66 actually defer to agency fact-finding, or at least
regularly pay lip service to the notion of presumptive validity. That
the courts do not apply the concept uniformly is an understatement.
Although the variations are almost infinite, one can divide the deci
sional universe into three broad categories of approach: the "hard
look" cases;67 what I call the "quick look" cases;68 and the "no look"
cases. 69The absence of uniform adherence to one standard of defer
ence magnifies the significance of forum shopping to some extent. 70
The characteristics of the "hard look" line of cases are perhaps
issuing a permit to emit air pollutants under section 165 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.c.
v 1981) (an exercise of informal rulemaking) to the same degree as it does
in issuing a permit to emit water pollutants under section 402 of the Clean Water Act of
1948,33 U.S.c. § 1342 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For an adjudication, see generally Mara
thon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977).
66. See Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281,
290 (1974); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 749 (1972).
67. See, e.g., Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981); National Lime
Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 620 F.2d
1040 (4th Cir. 1980); Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976);
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976); Greater Boston Television Corp. v.
FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cerro denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). The most thought
ful proponent of the "hard look" approach was the late circuit judge Harold Leventhal.
See Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role ofthe Courts, 122 U. P A. L.
REV. 509 (1974); see also Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law
Under Close Scrutiny, 57 GEO. L.J. 699 (1979).
68. See, e.g., Lead Indust. Ass'n V. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980). This, like
many "quick look" decisions, purports to follow the "hard look" doctrine, but does not
really take a hard look at agency fact-finding. This illustrates that anyone seeking to
analyze a court's approach must look at how the court actually handled the fact-finding
issues, rather than simpiy rely on what the court says it is doing. See id.
69. See, e.g., Citizens Against The Refinery's Effects, Inc. V. EPA, 643 F.2d 178
(4th Cir. 1981) (decision involves related notion of deference to scientific judgment). See
infra text accompanying notes 97-132.
70. Forum shopping among the federal circuits can be risky, however, because dif
ferent panels within the larger circuit court benches may accord markedly different de
grees of deference. For example, the D.C. Circuit is generally regarded as a "hard look"
court, and yet some of its decisions are better described as "quick look," particularly
when issues of scientific judgment are raised. Later, the Fourth Circuit, conventional
wisdom holds, is a "hard look" jurisdiction where environmental regulations are chal
lenged by industry groups, and a "no look" jurisdiction when the petitioners are environ
mental organizations. There are, however, decisions of the court that defy this
generalization. The decisional patterns of panels of certain judges within each circuit are
more easily categorized, although it is not my intention to do so here, except in a general
way.

§ 7411 (Supp.
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best exemplified by the District of Columbia Circuit's opinion in Na
tional Lime Association v. EPA .71 In a lengthy opinion by Judge
Wald, the court struck down the Environmental Protection Agency's
standards for lime kilns.72 The court devoted substantial ink to a
detailed analysis of the technical documents relied on by EPA, com
peting technical documents inserted into the record by commenta
tors, and other technical material contained in the rulemaking
record. 73 The opinion is nothing less than a microscopic view of
every significant aspect of the agency's rulemaking, a task that re
quired the mastery of the industry'S terminology and, indeed, the
nature of the lime manufacturing process to an incredible degree.
The remand of the regulation (which established numerical emission
limits for particular matter and opacity limits from lime kilns) was
based primarily on the court's conclusions that EPA did not study a
broad enough range of plant types, and thus its data was not suffi
ciently representative of the emission reduction capability of the sub
category as a whole. 74
The detail of the court's scrutiny of the record is illustrated by
71. 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
72. New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) are required to be promulgated
under section III of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.c. § 7411(f) (Supp. V 1981). The statute
requires the EPA to set numerical emission limits for pollutants emitted by new facilities
which reflect the "degree of emission reduction achievable through the application of the
best system of continuous emission reduction which ... has been adequately demon
strated for that category of sources." fd. § 7411(a)(I)(C). The statute requires the EPA
to assess the operating technology and determine which is the "best" system in terms of
removal efficiency, cost effectiveness, etc., that has been "adequately demonstrated." fd.
The EPA goes about this task by hiring a technical contractor who surveys a representa
tive sample group of candidate facilities, and evaluates them as well as the level of re
search and development work, and technology transferable from other types of facilities.
The contractor writes a "development document," upon which the EPA bases its
regulation.
73. Judge Wald, in a conversation with the author after the decision was rendered,
told an amusing anecdote about the record. The agency had, following its usual AP A
practice, certified an index to the administrative record. After the briefs came in, and
oral argument was held, the court determined that it needed to look at relevant docu
ments in the record not contained in the joint appendix filed with the briefs. The agency
was asked to produce a list of documents, which in due course arrived in a large number
of boxes. For the next few months the hapless law clerk assigned to the opinion was
wedded to a shopping cart full of agency paper.
This anecdote raises a troublesome issue, related to the deference issue. Complex
agency rulemakings generate awesome amounts of paper. It is not unusual for a
rule making record at the EPA or the FDA to consume ten or more four-drawer filing
cabinets. The parties' appendix is usually highly selective and reproduces documents
that reference other documents not included in the appendix. This presents the obvious
difficulty for the conscientious "hard look" court of how much judicial and law clerk
time should be devoted to wading through documents in the spirit of thoroughness.
74. 627 F.2d at 434 & n.54.
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references in the opinion to the minutes of meetings held by EPA75
and by detailed discussions of a number of technical reports culled
from the record. 76 The court held the agency to an exceedingly high
standard of explication. Although it disdained an intention to re
quire "ninety-five percent certainty in all the facts which enter into
the Agency's decision,"77 the court's rejection of EPA's data base ar
guably put the agency to a measure more stringent than "the stan
dard of ordinary civil litigation," which the court says "demands
only 51% certainly."78
The "hard look" approach, at least as manifested in National
Lime, has the advantage of keeping the agency's "nose to the grind
stone." Assuming the court and the law clerks are able to master the
technical nuances to a reasonable degree, it is less likely that shoddy
data gathering by an agency, or regulatory sleight of hand will go
undetected. On the other hand, it is far from certain that in the great
majority of cases a remand for more data gathering will alter the
substance of the final rule. One typical agency strategy on remand is
simply to "fix up" the record by filling in gaps identified by the
court, and explaining away the new data as cumulative or not as
representative of the old data, and then emerge essentially with the
same rule. 79
The "hard look" cases consume excessive amounts of judicial
time. The National Lime case is instructive on this point. Th~ lime
manufacturing industry, as air polluters go, represents a compara
tively small cluster of sources. Its pollutants are not exotic, and the
technology employed to control them is not exceedingly complex or
unique. Yet the court personnel must have spent thousands of hours
in background research, record reviews and analysis to produce an
opinion of more than 30 pages, containing 146 footnotes. 8o
There is, finally, the concern that the "hard look" will cross the
unclear line that divides appellate review from de novo review. In
National Lime, for example, EPA's position was not without support
75. Id. at 442.
76. E.g., id. at 436 n.59, 60, 438-42.
77. Id. at 453-54. The court's reference to 95% certainty relates to the 5% standard
deviation accepted for scientific peer review. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,28 n.58
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
78. 627 F.2d at 453 n.139.
79. See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 6439-40 (1980).
80. See 627 F.2d at 416. A similarly lengthy "hard look" opinion, also authored
by Judge Wald, is Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506
(D.C. Cir. 1983). A characteristic of the truly "hard look" opinion is their length, in spite
of the relatively narrow issues involved.
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in the record. Agency engineers had made a judgment that they had
enough data on which to base the standards the agency had adopted
for air pollution emissions from new lime kilns, and it is on this
point of judgment that the court and the agency disagreed. This
point becomes all the more troubling when one reviews the briefs of
the parties and finds that the point on which the court dwells at
greatest length, namely representatives, was hardly addressed at all
in the briefs. 8 ) There is a point at which a court's insistence on rec
ord support and on the agency's explication of its reasons for acting
based on one quantum of data rather than some greater quantum
amounts to a disguised substitution of the court's judgment for that
of the agency's. To avoid such substitution requires a measure of
restraint that is arguably not inherent in the "hard look" approach.
The "no look" cases portend a tyranny of another sort. In two
cases, both styled Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects v. EPA 82
(CARE I and CARE I I) separate challenges were made by the same
petitioner to air pollution permits83 issued by EPA to the developer
of a proposed oil port/oil refinery complex in Hampton Roads, Vir
ginia. The petitioner, in two lengthy briefs, attacked the mathemati
cal modeling used by EPA to predict sulfur dioxide dispersion from
the refinery. It argued that EPA's data was incorrect, and that cer
tain analytical assumptions made by the agency were designed to
underpredict pollutant concentrations. 84 In the second case, CARE
II, the petitioner argued strenuously that the State of Virginia and
EPA violated the Clean Air Act in the way they calculated hydrocar
bon reductions resulting from a change in the type of paving asphalt
used on rural roads, which were used to offset hydrocarbon emis
sions expected to be generated by the refinery complex. 85
The Fourth Circuit made quick work of the petitioner'S plea.
Relying on Overton Park and Udall (which also form the foundation
of the "hard look" cases), the court expressly refused to do much
more than blink at the record. The Fourth Circuit's philosophy is
typified by the following quotation from its opinion in CARE I:
81. See Brief for Petitioner, National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
82. 643 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1981); 643 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981).
83. I have deliberately chosen an air pollution case for consistency and in order to
avoid potential ambiguity arising out of a different statutory scheme. See, e.g. , National
Lime, 627 F .2d at 452 n.127, where the court alludes to a gloss allegedly placed on "arbi
trary and capricious" review by the legislative history of the 1977 amendments to the
Clean Air Act.
84. 643 F.2d at 181.
85. Id. at 186.
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"CARE argues that this Court must examine in great detail the tech
nical modeling data submitted to the agency and, in considering this
data as well as materials outside the record, determine that EPA ap
proval of the HRECS permit was unlawful. This we cannot do."86
That, of course, is precisely what the District of Columbia Cir
cuit in National Lime did do. The Fourth Circuit's two CARE opin
ions address each issue raised by the petitioner very briefly. The
court typically stated the bare outline of the petitioner's argument
and then dismissed it, stating that on the record EPA's action was
not arbitrary and capricious. The opinions include little substantive
discussion of the factual issues raised in the case. Thus, deference to
EPA as a fact-finder is effectively total,87
Courts following the "no look" philosophy have not had to ex
pend substantial judicial time on rulemaking appeals. Moreover, to
the extent forum shopping is possible,88 litigants will tend to avoid
bringing rulemaking challenges before such courts. The major diffi
culty presented by this approach to judicial review is a risk that erro
neous or illegal agency action will effectively escape review, where
the agency acted in procedurally regular manner.
The "no look" approach accords far less scrutiny to agency fact
finding than is normally given to fact-finding by a trial judge. 89
Since administrative agencies are subject to many political and other
86. Id. at 181. The court's reference to "materials outside the record" is curious.
CARE's brief does not reveal any reliance on facts outside EPA's record. The court may
have been referring to EPA documents, such as its "Guidelines for Air Quality Models,"
which CARE argued EPA ignored. While not formally inserted in the rulemaking rec
ord of each permit proceeding, such generic documents form part of the body of "law"
that arguably binds the agency.
87. Cf., Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. EPA, Nos. 79-1025, 80-2772 (3rd Cir.
1981), cerro denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982). In this case several petitioners brought serious
challenges to EPA's relaxation of the sulfur dioxide emission limits for two power plants
in West Virginia. A number of record inadequacies were argued, and EPA initially
sought a limited remand during which it sought to cure one of the more obvious
problems. Over three hundred pages of briefs were filed, along with a thousand pages of
appendix. The court dismissed the petitions with a one-sentence order, without opinion,
the day after oral argument. Id. Although such disposition is common for dismissal of
obviously frivolous cases on motion, this case was not in any sense frivolous. The Third
Circuit's action appears to represent the court's refusal to wade into the thick of a factu
ally complex rulemaking case.
88. Forum shopping is the practice wherein litigants seek to have their case adjudi
cated in what they perceive to be the most favorable forum. Such a practice is permissi
ble where the Judicial Review provision does not specify a court of exclusive venue.
Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (1976) with 42 U.S.c. § 7607 (Supp. V 1981).
89. See, e.g., Rogers v. Loage, 50 U.S.L.W. 5041 (1982) (Court refused to disturb
district court findings of fact as to intentional discrimination unless they appeared to be
clearly erroneous).
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extraneous pressures not affecting trial judges to as great an extent, a
reasonably strong argument can be made that the bias should tilt the
other way. One gets a sense that the "no look" courts are simply
unwilling to grapple with the technical issues often presented in
health and environmental rule making appeals. 9o After one reads a
good sample of the briefs presented in these cases, the courts' view
garners a measure of sympathy. The briefs often contain detailed
technical arguments that are full of acronyms and regulatory jargon
foreign to the vocabulary of most judges.91 Given the choice be
tween deference and spending untold numbers of hours simply to
understand the terminology employed, before getting to the legal ar
guments advanced, many overworked judges naturally opt for
deference. 92
A significant number of the cases fall into the "quick look" cate
gory. While "quick look" decisions sometimes purport to be in the
"hard look" category, they characteristically do not peer behind the
excerpts of the record reproduced by the litigants in the appendix
filed with the briefs. 93 This approach accordingly places a justifiably
heavier burden on a petitioner to demonstrate the presence of signifi
cant gaps or anomolies in the record. It arguably also fosters the
writing of less technical briefs, since "quick look" judges cannot be
assumed to have the desire to educate themselves about the subject
matter of the agency's rulemaking. Finally, the agency's own expli
cation of the reasons for making this or that choice become the focal
point of a "quick look" court's analysis. 94
In spite of the abundance of "hard look" rhetoric that has found
its way into regulatory agency cases in recent years, the number of
true "hard look" cases is relatively small. 95 Heavy court dockets and
practical limitations on the judges' ability to become thoroughly fa
miliar with the agencies' business no doubt will keep the number of
true "hard look" cases small. The relative percentage of decisions of
the "no look" variety may well increase, particularly as the govern
90. See Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects v. EPA, 643 F.2d 178 (4th Cir.
1981).
91. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee, Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.
1973).
92. A related issue is the philosophical question regarding the extent to which
judges should actively review decisions of a highly technical or scientific nature at all.
See infra notes 97-132 and accompanying text.
93. There are "quick look" examples in virtually all of the circuits, including the
D.C. Circuit. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
94. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
95. See infra note 123.
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ment continues to press arguments that the courts should accord def
erence to complex technical issues (that are, in fact, complex), and
particularly if the "regulatory reform" enthusiasts convince Con
gress to reduce drastically the exclusive jurisdiction of the District of
Columbia Circuit to review certain agencies' rules. 96
IV.

DEFERENCE TO SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL JUDGMENTS
MADE BY AGENCIES

The tendency of judges to refuse to look closely at agency fac
tual determinations, policy choices, or to an agency's interpretation
of statutory terms, has in recent years become even more pro
nounced where the agency's decision has involved scientific or tech
nical issues. It has become almost a mandatory part of the
boilerplate in briefs and opinions involving EPA, for example, that
more deference than usual is due when the issues are scientific or
technical. 97
A lively debate flourished in the mid-1970s among the judges of
the District of Columbia Circuit over the role of the courts in review
ing technically complex agency decisions. This debate is set out in
microcosm in the en bane opinions of the District of Columbia Cir
cuit in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA .98 Judge Leventhal was the primary advo
cate for active judicial scrutiny of even the most complex scientific
96. See, e.g., S. 1472, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982); H.R. REP. No. 435, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). It is obviously easier to take a
"hard look" at a regulatory decision the second time around. The mere fact that one
judge on the panel has become familiar with the regulatory jargon the agency uses gives
that panel a significant headstart toward grasping the issues with the sophistication
needed for the "hard look." Having wrestled with the Clean Air Act in National Lime,
Judge Wald doubtless was required to spend less time in taking a hard look at the issues
in Small Refiners Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 643 F .2d 178 (4th Cir. 1981),
decided two years later. Thus, to the extent Congress confines rulemaking appeals to the
D.C. Circuit, that court's institutional knowledge of the programs necessarily increases to
a sufficient degree of sophistication that the "hard look" can be done more expeditiously.
97. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135 n.25
(1977) (deference is needed in view of "the complexity and technical nature of the stat
utes and the subjects they regulate, ... and EPA's unique experience and expertise")
(quoting American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 450 n.16 (7th Cir. 1975»; National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 656 F.2d 768, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (heightened deference to statu
tory interpretation); Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects v. EPA, 643 F.2d 178, 183
(4th Cir. 1981); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,66 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, c.J., con
curring). Contra, Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974); POI"!land
Cement Ass'n v.Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
921 (1974).
98. 541 F.2d I, 33-37, 66-69, 97-100 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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issues on appea1. 99 Leventhal's view was that since Congress granted
administrative agencies broad discretion to make scientific judg
ments, judges must "acquire whatever technical knowledge is neces
sary as background for decision of the legal questions," 100 in order to
properly fulfill their constitutional mandate. The opposing view, ar
ticulated by Chief Judge Bazelon, is that judges are simply ill
equipped to peer into the substance of technical agency decisions. 101
Judge Bazelon's approach to keeping the agencies honest, at least at
the time the Ethyl case was decided,102 was to impose upon them a
stringent standard of procedural correctness, "to establish a decision
making process which assures [that] a reasoned decision . . . can be
held up to the scrutiny of the scientific community and the
public." 103
At bottom, Judge Bazelon's Ethyl position enables courts to
look more closely at the substance of agency decisions in familiar
subject areas than they do in unfamiliar areas. 104 While that posi
tion no doubt accurately accommodates the realities occasioned by
99. See Leventhal, EnvironmentallJecisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974); see also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,68 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(Leventhal, J., concurring). See generally L. TRIBE, CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY
THROUGH LAW (1972); LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTIES OF WEATHER MODIFI
CATION (W. Thomas, ed. 1977); Bazelon, Coping With Technology Through the Legal
Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 817 (1977); Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses ofScient(/ic Infor
mation in Environmental lJecisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 371 (1974); Green, The
Risk-Benefit Calculus in Safety lJeterminations, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 791 (1975); Mc
Garity, Substantive and ProcedurallJiscretion in Administrative Resolution ofScience Pol
icy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 749-53
(1979) (arguing for deference to speed up the regulatory process); Tribe, Technology As
sessment and the Fourth lJiscontinuity: The Limits ofInstrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL.
L. REV. 371 (1974).
100. 541 F.2d at 68. Judge Leventhal came very close to suggesting that if the
courts of appeals are not able to muster the knowledge necessary to undertake close
scrutiny, Congress should consider "science courts," or similar technically trained courts.
See id. ("If technical difficulties loom large, Congress may push to establish specialized
courts.")
101. Id. at 67 (Bazelon, c.J., concurring) ("[S]ubstantive review of mathematical
and scientific evidence by technically illiterate judges is dangerously unreliable . . . .").
102. The Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Co. v. Nat
ural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), may have caused him to move
a bit closer to Judge Leventhal's position.
103. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (Bazelon, c.J., concurring).
104. See 541 F.2d at 66.
It is one thing for judges to scrutinize FCC judgments concerning diversifica
tion of media ownership to determine if they are rational [a reference to
Greater Boston TV v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,403
U.S. 923 (1971).]. But I doubt judges contribute much to improving the quality
of the difficult decisions which must be made in highly technical areas when
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time and human intellectual limitations, it permits a double standard
of judicial review: one for agencies dealing in subject-matter within
the realm of common experience of most judges and lawyers, and yet
another for agencies operating outside that realm. While one might
argue that in some ways such a result makes sense, it suffers from
two important drawbacks: (1) there is no evidence that Congress has
intended such a distinction to be drawn; and (2) in the absence of the
creation of specialized courts, this approach virtually assures that
many actions of technically-oriented agencies will go effectively
unreviewed. 105
A serious difficulty with the procedural grindstone approach
(which basically presumes deference to substantive decisions) advo
cated by Judge Bazelon in Ethyl is that the Supreme Court, in Ver
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Difense
Council (Vermont Yankee 11)106 seriously limited the court of ap
peals' ability to structure administrative agency procedures.
In Vermont Yankee I, Natural Resources Difense Council, Inc. v.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 107 Judge Bazelon's opinion carried
out the philosophy articulated in his concurring opinion in Ethyl.
The court set aside portions of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) rule that prohibited individual licensing boards from consid
ering, as environmental costs, the environmental risks associated
with the production of nuclear fuel and the disposal of nuclear
waste. The NRC had decided to treat that issue "generically," and
held hearings on the nuclear fuel cycle impacts. 108 The District of
Columbia Circuit found that the procedures employed by the NRC
were inadequate to thoroughly examine the waste disposal issues, 109
they take it upon themselves to decide. . . that 'in assessing the scientific and
medical data the Administrator made clear errors of judgment.'
Id. (citing Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976».
\05. Judge Leventhal replied to Chief Judge Bazelon's position, see supra note 104,
in this way:
Our obligation is not to be jettisoned because our initial technical understand
ing may be meagre when compared to our initial grasp of FCC or freedom of
speech questions. When called upon to make de novo decisions, individual
judges have had to acquire the learning pertinent to complex technical ques
tions in such fields as economics, science, technology and psychology. Our role
is not as demanding when we are engaged in review of agency decisions.
541 F.2d at 69.
\06. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
\07. 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
\08. Id. at 655. (The NRC had limited consideration of such costs to "generic"
rulemaking proceedings). See Note, Judicial Review of Generic Rulemaking: The Experi
ence if the Nue/ear Regulatory Commission, 65 GEO. L.J. 1295 (1977).
\09. 547 F.2d at 641.
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and the court ordered the NRC to permit consideration of the issues
in individual license adjudications. llo
The Supreme Court's now famous Vermont Yankee II opinion
knocked the underpinnings from Judge Bazelon's procedural theory
of judicial review in technically complex cases. In sweeping lan
guage, the Court held that the courts of appeals are without author
ity to review and overturn rulemaking proceedings "on the basis of
the procedural devices employed (or not employed) . . . ." l l l Re
view of an agency's decision, the Court said, must stand or fall on
the propriety of the agency's fact-finding. "If that finding is not sus
tainable on the administrative record made, then [it] ... must be
vacated." I 12
Vermont Yankee II, by removing from the courts the procedural
option championed by Judge Bazelon, leaves them with only two
choices: undertaking the excruciatingly in-depth review argued for
by the late Harold Leventhal,113 or essentially abdicating the review
function where technical matters are at issue. I 14 The choice is inher
ently in the first instance a much more difficult one for the courts
themselves to make than for the Congress. Moreover, as the gradual
merger of "substantial evidence" and "arbitrary and capricious" into
a more or less single standard of review demonstrates, 115 what Con
110. There is some language in the opinion supporting a secondary holding-that
the NRC's record was inadequate to support the rule. See id. at 654; see also Id. at 659
(Tamm, J., concurring). The Supreme Court later concluded, however, that the court
had struck down the rule on the procedural ground. Vermont Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 541-42 (1978).
111. 435 U.S. at 548.
112. Id. at 549 (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973».
113. Judge Leventhal died in 1979, and with his death the courts lost their most
articulate advocate for close judicial scrutiny of agency decisions. His last opinion, pub
lished posthumously, was Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
in which he rejected an agency argument that the court should defer to the agency's
construction of a provision of the Clean Air Act, and not undertaken its own evaluation
of Congressional intent. Although she has thus far not articulated her own philosophical
view of the issue, Judge Wald's opinions in National Lime and Small Refiner Lead
Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1983), seem to be cut from the
Leventhal mold. But see National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir.
1982), in which she accords quite broad deference to the administrative agency, to a
degree arguably inconsistent with the preceding decisions. National Wildlife involved
deference to EPA's statutory interpretation, while the other cases involved review of the
factual record for support for a standard.
114. For his part, Judge Bazelon seems to have reacted to Vermont Yankee II by
moving a bit closer to the Leventhal view. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459 (D.C.Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Ver
mont Yankee III], wherein he waded through the technical complexities of the NRC's S
3 table, concluding that the agency's reliance on it was arbitrary and capricious.
115. Schwartz, supra note 9, at 450.
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gress were to say about deference may not ultimately matter anyway.
It is important in this context to explore the underpinnings of the
"scientific and technical" deference doctrine.
The assumption underlying the "scientific and technical" defer
ence doctrine is that agency personnel possess technical expertise
making them better able to make policy and legal judgments in tech
nical and scientific subject areas than Congress or the courts. I 16 Cast
in another light, it could be said that the notion is a manifestation of
the mystique with which contemporary society clothes science. It is
thus perfectly understandable for the judiciary, having grown up and
having been schooled in this perception, to say "Who am I to ques
tion the choices made by those invested with superior knowledge?"
The answer to this, of course, is that this perception ignores the
realities of agency decisionmaking. Historically, the upper manage
ment of technical agencies have been political appointees who are
not necessarily experts (indeed, they are often lawyers), and who
serve at most for a few years. While there is often a degree of in
grained experience among the middle managers, the turnover of
technical and legal personnel at an agency like EPA or the Occupa
tional Safety and Health Administration is relatively high.1I7 These
agencies have, in recent years, been staffed by a significant percent
age of young professionals, whose exposure to the subject-matter of
a particular regulation may in fact be not much greater than that of a
,
judge who has previously heard one of the agency's cases.
The agencies do indeed employ scientists and engineers, and
these people compile and analyze data that ultimately forms the ba
sis of a challenged rule. Nevertheless, it is possible for these people
to articulate their data and analyses in narrative form that is under
standable by intelligent judges. They are required to do so in order
to explain their recommendations to their non-technical superiors.
What makes the "hard look" in technical cases difficult and
cumbersome is very often not the inherent complexity of the under
lying subject-matter so much as the degree to which the agency's
116. See Baze1on, Coping With Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 COR
NELL L. REV. 817 (1977).
117. For example, from 1980 to 1982 the agency lost 2,312 civilian employees.
U,S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (!03d ed.
1982-1983). Moreover, reports in 1982 had indicated that the agency's attrition rate was
running at a rate of 32 percent a year. However, in a press briefing on February 5, 1982,
EPA Chief of Staff John F. Daniel disputed the 32% attrition rate figure and stated that
attrition was lower than usual in fiscal 1981 and 1982. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
INC., FEDERAL REGULATORY DIRECTORY 1983-1984 111-42 (1983).
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record-gathering and often labyrinthine decisionmaking procedures
tend to obfuscate the issues. I IS
A carefully-crafted preamble to a technical rule, published in
the Federal Register, should be able to identify, in understandable
language, the key issues of contention in the rulemaking, and explain
which issues relate to interpretation or extrapolation of scientific
data, and which involve policy choices, such as choosing one set of
assumptions over another for reasons of philosophy, practical ad
ministration or statutory interpretation. The extent to which an
agency's preamble will achieve clarity will be dependent on the sub
stantive knowledge and expressive ability of the people who write
the document. An inexperienced staff attorney who does not under
stand the rulemaking issues well will be no better able to produce a
readable preamble than a staff technical expert unskilled in the art of
writing. Employment of the skills of professional technically-trained
writer-editors could not only foster the production of understandable
preambles, but could also produce useful, functional indices to cum
bersome rulemaking records. 119
A contributing, related factor is the refusal of lawyers to frame
the issues for the court in a concise, understandable form. My re
view of scores of briefs filed in EPA rulemaking appeals between
118. What are very often litigated, moreover, are policy decisions that have been
made by non-expen agency managers, who have presumably understood the record sub
sequently placed before the coun. In EPA and other agencies, the text of the regulations
is, in its fonnal fonn, often written by the agency's lawyers. In addition, technical mat
ters that initially appear to the layman opaque will often tum out to be relatively simple
when looked at closely. The technology employed to control paniculate emissions from
air pollution sources, seeming complex at first blush, is actually quite simple. A
"baghouse," for example, is one type of device used to remove particulates. This tech
nology, discussed in Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375,390-91 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) cerl. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974), is basically little more than a large version of
the common domestic vacuum cleaner.
119. The EPA has utilized writer-editors to assist it in some of its complex
rulemakings. Indices to the record are filed routinely by federal agencies with the courts
of appeals. FED. R. ApP. P. 16, 17; 28 U.S.c. § 2112(a) (1976). Ordinarily the litigants
provide the court with copies of the portions of the record they consider relevant to the
issues raised in the appeal in a joint, deferred appendix. FED. R. ApP. P. 30(c).
Neither the federal rules nor any federal statute require agencies to annotate the
preamble to a regulation with specific cross-references to documents or testimony in the
record, or to key the index to points made in the preamble. Often the litigants' appendix
excludes record material that the court could find helpful, particularly if it is reviewing a
broad-based challenge to a rule premised on alleged inadequate support in the record.
The indices to the record are most often simply either an alphabetical or chronological
list of documents contained in the agency's file. By requiring the agencies to annotate the
preamble, and to produce useful indices, which the courts could accomplish by amending
Rule 17, review of cumbersome records could be facilitated greatly.
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1977 and 1982 has led me to conclude that this fault seems to affect
government lawyers more frequently than private practitioners, and
agency lawyers more frequently than Justice Department lawyers. 120
The briefs are loaded with acronyms and other examples of regu
latoryese that require at least a glossary of terms to be understanda
ble. The arguments on technical substantive issues are often crabbed
and convoluted, owing sometimes to the author's own inadequate
grasp of the issue and perhaps more often, to an effort to economize
on space in the face of a court's rigidly-imposed page limit. 121
The argument most frequently made in favor of great deference
is that judicial "evaluation of the scientific evidence inevitably in
vites judges of opposing views to make plausible-sounding, but sim
plistic, judgments of the relative weight to be afforded various pieces
of technical data."122 This argument, however, can be rebutted in
several ways. First, there are numerous examples among the "hard
look" cases of successful judicial handling of scientific issues in an
intelligent, not overly simplistic way.123
120. The relationship between the Justice Department and its agency clients is an
uncertain one. Some agencies, such as OSHA and the NRC, possess their own litigating
authority, and thus their court of appeals briefs receive only cursory review by the Justice
Department, or none at all. Both the EPA and the Justice Department operate under a
formalized arrangement by which agency attorneys write all or a portion of early and
final drafts of most briefs. Agency and Justice attorneys and their supervisors work in
committee fashion in producing briefs. Disputes over brief content are negotiated, with
the Justice Department possessing final authority in such matters.
121. Page limitations have become common in the various circuits' local rules.
Fifty pages is the most common limit. The government can suffer heavily if it must
respond to arguments raised by several separate litigants in a consolidated case, (each of
whom, absent intelligent case management by the circuit administrator, has fifty pages
available), and yet may not exceed the page limitation. This problem can also be allevi
ated somewhat by aggressive case administration by the circuit's staff counsel. Litigants
with essentially the same point of view can be required to combine their efforts into a
single brief, for example, with a negotiated page limitation. Furthermore, well-orches
trated settlement discussions conducted under the court's own timetable can weed out
many issues before briefing, thereby lessening the complexity of the case in the end.
There is a theoretical downside to such a practice, however. Persons who are not
parties to rulemaking litigation "settlement" discussions may object to them on the
ground that the discussions constitute closed-door rulemaking from which the public is
foreclosed. Although any such "settlement" which results in repeal or amendment of a
portion of the challenged regulation must be formally adopted by the agency pursuant to
APA rulemaking procedures, non-party opponents can argue, with some force, that in
the case of "settlement" rules, the procedures are little more than a sham. The proposed
rule is a de facto fait accompli, since the agency has arguably staked its credibility with
the court on successful completion of the deal.
122. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 66 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
123. See, e.g., Lead Indust. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In Lead
Industries the court was able to grasp, in a sophisticated manner, issues relating to blood
chemistry, sensitive population groups and exposure pathways.
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A second response lies in the nature of the issues raised in
rulemaking appeals. The courts are rarely asked to examine techni
cally complex data. More often the challengers are arguing that the
agency ignored relevant data,124 that it acted without any data or
enough data under a statute which did not give it such latitude,125 or
that it based its decision on irrelevant factors.126 The hardest cases,
and those most clearly calling for deference, are those in which the
agency is confronted with starkly conflicting expert evidence and a
statute that requires it to act within a short time frame. In those
cases the court must determine whether the evidence is roughly of
equal credibility and that the agency's choice of a course of action
was based on a reasonable and adequately articulated set of policy
judgments. In all of these cases there is no reason why the courts
should not examine the record carefully, and no reason to conclude
that they would not be competent to do SO.127
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Baltimore Gas and Elec
tric Co. v. NRIJC128 (Vermont Yankee IV), however, may well serve
to remove the last arrow from the quiver of those who seek to chal
lenge the actions of technical agencies. Reversing a decision of the
District of Columbia Circuit,129 the Court, in a gesture of sweeping
deference to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ruled that the
Commission's generic rule that discounts the environmental conse
quences of the uncertainties surrounding nuclear waste disposal, and
those associated with potentially long-term storage of high level ra
dioactive waste from nuclear power plants is not arbitrary and capri
cious, even though the Commission's record demonstrated
substantial uncertainty as to whether and how much waste could be
safely disposed. 130
The Court's previous decision on the subject, Vermont Yankee
124. National Lime, 627 F.2d at 433.
125. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 37.
126. Sierra Club v. Cosde, 657 F.2d 298, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
127. There is no special magic in assessing the weight of scientific opinion, or em
pirical studies. In the first case, a court can ascertain from the briefs and the record
whether the agency consulted scientists of appropriate credentials, and whether there is
clearly a more significant body of opinion on one side of the issue. In the second, the
validity of a scientific study is dependent upon (a) the amassing of a statistically signifi
cant quantum of data; (b) application of appropriate methodology; and (c) screening out
confounding variables. What it takes to constitute good scientific method in a given area
is available in the literature, and should be apparent on the face of the agency's record.
128. 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983).
129. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 685
F.2d459 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
130. 103 S. Ct. at 2255-57. Compare 685 F.2d at 477.
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II, prohibited the Court from following Judge Bazelon's formula for
utilizing procedural constraints to keep technical agencies from
abusing their authority.131 In Baltimore Gas and Electric, the Court
stated, seemingly without critical evaluation, that the courts must
"remember that the Commission is making predictions, within its
area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science. When examining
this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings of
fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential."l32
Adopting a "no look" approach to the NRC, the Court effectively
cut off judicial review of all but the most mundane of the agency's
rules.
V.

DEFERENCE TO AN AGENCY'S STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Most of the reasons advanced for judicial deference to adminis
trative agency fact-finding do not apply, at least directly, where def
erence is claimed for statutory interpretation. In interpreting a piece
of organic legislation, the agency is not weighing evidence presented
to it in the first instance. Interpreting a statute does not require any
special technical expertise. \33 Even a statute whose subject matter is
technical is produced by a non-technical group of legislators, and
has behind it a body of legislative history that is as available to
judges and litigants as it is to the agency.
The two most common arguments made in favor of deference to
131. See supra text accompanying notes 106-12; see also D. STEVER, JR., SEA
BROOK AND THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, THE LICENSING OF A NUCLEAR
POWER PLANT 14-22 (1980).
132. 103 S. Ct. at 2256 (citing Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607, 656 (1980».
Arguably, the Court misconstrues what the court of appeals did. Judge Bazelon's
opinion simply said that the law does not permit the NRC, in undertaking a benefit-cost
analysis, to ascribe a cost of zero to an activity whose costs, by the agency's own admis
sion, are unknown. 685 F.2d at 484-85. There are well-known techniques for accounting
for uncertainty, and the upshot of the court of appeals' decision was to require the NRC
to employ them to achieve complete public disclosure of the costs of licensing nuclear
power plants.
Other language in the Court's opinion invites speculation that the Court felt that the
court of appeals had substituted its own policy judgments for those of the NRC. See 103
S. Ct. at 2252 ("fundamental policy questions" are not for the courts to resolve). This
perception was no doubt ruled by the concurring opinion of circuit Judge Edwards, who
made no bones about his dissatisfaction with the government's current nuclear energy
policy. 685 F.2d at 496-97 (Edwards, J., concurring).
133. But see National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 167 (D.C. Cir.
1982) ("construction of act likely to require scientific and technical expertise") (relying
on Dupont v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135 n.25 (1977); and Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 656 F.2d 768, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1981».
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an agency's statutory interpretation are: (1) that the agency works
with the statute every day and presumably thereby acquires a unique
understanding of it; 134 and (2) that the agency acquires a unique un
derstanding of what Congress intended by participating in the legis
lative process. l35
The first of these arguments fits best a situation in which an
agency is confronted with facially conflicting statutory commands
and no helpful legislative history.l36 In such a case it would seem
that any rational scheme developed by the agency to reconcile the
conflict should be upheld. Agencies do not, however, always inter
pret their statutes for such benign reasons; for example, as a reason
able attempt at reconciliation. An agency may interpret a provision
narrowly because that construction requires less work by agency per
sonnel,137 or interpret the statute in a way that better serves the cur
rent political viewpoint of the appointed agency officials. l38
The range of interpretive situations in which an agency must
construe a statute based on its workaday knowledge, in the absence
of legislative guidance available to the courts, should be quite nar
row. There is a danger that if the courts mechanically defer to an
agency's reading of an organic statute on the agency's claim of supe
134. See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719
(1975); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. I, 16 (1965); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sumner Fin. Corp., 451 F.2d 898, 902
(5th Cir. 1971).
135. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 556 (1980); Frank
Diehl Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 696 F.2d 1325 (11th Cir. 1983); Natural Re
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 656 F.2d 768, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
136. See, e.g., Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 890-91 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (agency choice of one of two conflicting deadline provisions given deference).
137. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("EPA rec
ognized that its definition [of the term "major emitting facility"] placed an intolerable
burden on both the agency and minor sources of pollution and sought to cope with it by
creating a broad exemption for smaller sources. As we explain . . . the Act does not give
the agency a free hand authority to grant broad exemptions.").
138. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718,
720 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2427 (1983).
Under EPA's current, bubble concept regulation, effective October 14, 1981,
source means an entire plant. Under the regulation previously in force, an indi
vidual piece of process equipment within the plant ranked as a source. EPA
changed its definition of source expressly to cut back substantially the coverage
of non-attainment area new source review.
Id. at 720 (footnotes omitted). The court does not state what becomes obvious upon
reading the Federal Register and related EPA internal documents. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766
(1981). The revisionist statutory interpretation was part of the "regulatory reform" phi
losophy of the Reagan administration, which disliked much of what it had inherited
from the EPA under the Carter administration.
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rior working knowledge, self-serving and incorrect agency decisions
will be upheld unless contrary legislative intent is particularly strong.
The sole inquiry when an agency's interpretation of a statute is chal
lenged is: "What was Congress's intention?" The courts have avail
able to them sufficient information concerning an agency's history
under the statute at issue, and sufficient access to legislative history,
to enable them to make independent judgments as to the lawfulness
of the agency's interpretation without according deference to the
agency. 139
The second argument in favor of interpretive deference rests on
a false premise: by involvement in the legislative process concerning
its statutes, an agency has the inside track on legislative intent. 140 It
should first be understood that the affected agency is not always a
significant actor in the battles to create or amend organic
legislation. 141
There is, of course, a great deal of agency-initiated legislation,
and agencies often take an advocacy position in connection with
pending legislation that affects their programs. 142 There are, how
ever, many other actors in the legislative drama whose roles often
139. An agency's prior practices may influence Congress when it amends a statute.
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 u.s.c. § 1344 (Supp. v 1981), provides an exam
ple. The statute requires a permit from the Secretary of the Army prior to the discharge
of dredged or fill material into a wetland or water body. Id. Prior to the enacfment of
this provision in 1972, the Army (acting through the Corps of Engineers) had regulated
similar activity under the River and Harbor Act of 1899, 33 U.S.c. § 403 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981). Congress chose to confer permit issuing authority on the Army rather than the
EPA, the legislative history demonstrates, because the Corps had an existing permit pro
gram. Subsequently, an issue was raised as to the legality of the legislative-style hearing
held by the Corps. It had been held that, under virtually identical statutory language, the
EPA was required to hold adjudicatory hearings in connection with its permit-issuing
activities pursuant to section 402 of the Act. 33 U.S.c. § 1342 (1976). Despite the simi
larity in statutory language, the courts that have confronted the issue have uniformly
concluded that Congress intended to engraft the Corps' pre-existing program of legisla
tive hearings onto section 404. See, e.g. , Buttrey v. United States, 690 F.2d 1170, 1175-76
(5th Cir. 1982).
140. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555,556 (1980); Frank
Diehl Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 696 F.2d 1325 (11th Cir. 1983).
141. The EPA, for example, played a very small role in the 1977 amendments that
significantly changed the Clean Air Act. See generally Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub.
L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.c.), reprinted in
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977, Serial No. 95
16 (1977) (printed by the U.S. Government Printing Office) [hereinafter A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS).
142. See generally SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORy-THE EVOLUTION OF
SELECTED SECTIONS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE COMPENSA
TION AND LIABILITY ACT (Needham, ed. 1982) (available through The Environmental
Law Institute, Washington, D.C.).
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equal or exceed that of the agency. 143 There is little logic in elevat
ing one actor over the others when it comes to according deference to
an opinion regarding what legislators have said. Moreover, since the
viewpoints of all participants are recorded faithfully in the Congres
sional Record, and are sometimes reprinted in bound "Legislative
History" compilations,l44 the courts, guided by litigants, can readily
discern the policy arguments considered by Congress, and compare
them with its ultimate output.
The courts of appeals are as divided in their approach to inter
pretive deference as they are with respect to the deference owed to
agency fact-finding and scientific and technical judgment.
What is most troubling about this schismatic pattern is that
there appears to be no doctrinal basis for deciding when to defer and
when not to defer. It is impossible to distinguish the "deference"
and the "no deference" cases, and examples of both approaches can
be found within the same circuit. 145 For analytical purposes, two
recent District of Columbia Circuit decisions are useful, National
Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch 146 (the "dams case") and Natural Re
sources Defense Council v. Gorsuch 147 (the "bubble case").
At issue in the dams case was EPA's refusal to subject hydroe
lectric and other dams to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimina
tion System (NPDES) permit requirements of the Clean Water
143. This is particularly true in environmental legislation. Industry lobbying
groups and environmental organizations possess substantial technical expertise, and have
functioned as integral players at virtually every stage of the legislative process that has
produced environmental legislation in recent years. See, e.g., J. KRIER & E. URSIN, POL
LUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA & FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH
MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION, 1940-1975 (1977).
144. See generally A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS,
supra note 141.
145. See Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (a "hard
look" case); American Paper Inst. v. EPA, 660 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1981) (a "quick look"
case); Citizens Against Refinery's Effects, Inc. v. EPA, 643 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1981) (a "no
look" case).
For similar disparity within the District of Columbia Circuit see, General Motors
Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, Nos. 80-1868, -2027, 81-1029 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 16, 1983) (a "hard
look" case); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 17
E.R.C. 1457 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (a "hard look" case); In re Surface Mining Regulation
Litigation, 627 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (a "hard look" case); Specialty Equip. Mkt.
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 720 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (a "quick look" case); Automotive
Parts Rebuilders Ass'n v. EPA, 720 F.2d 142 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (a "quick look" case);
Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (a "quick look" case); Environ
mental Defense Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (a "quick look" case);
National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416,431 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
146. 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
147. 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2427 (1983).
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Act. 148 The National Wildlife Federation had argued, and the dis
trict court had found,149 that dams changed the physical and chemi
cal properties of the water in a stream and produced adverse effects
on wildlife in a manner not significantly different from what occurs
as a result of traditional discharges of pollutant from a factory or a
municipal sewer.150 The district court therefore ordered EPA to
commence regulatory releases from dams under the NPDES permit
program. 151
EPA had been equivocal in its position on the issue. 152 Internal
agency documents revealed sharp disagreements among agency offi
cials, which persisted over a number of years, on the question of
what to do about the pollutant-like effect dams. 153 The government
had also reversed its position with respect to whether or not section
148. 33 U.S.c. § 1342 (1976).
149. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291, 1308 (D.D.C. 1982),
rev'd, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
150. The district court concluded that the stratification created in the pool behind a
dam induces certain chemical changes in the water. Water near the top is warmer and
richer in oxygen, for example, than water near the bottom. In water pollution parlance,
the lower water is low in dissolved oxygen. When this water is released from the dam, it
is considered to be discharged from a point source. Id. at 1313. The statute requires a
permit for the discharge of a pollutant from a point source. 33 U.S.c. § 1342 (1976).
The district court reasoned that since the statute defined "pollution" as the "man-made
or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological ip.tegrity
of water," 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (1976), the statutory definition of "pollutant" should be
construed broadly, and language in that definition apparently limiting its scope to pollu
tants discharged inlo water essentially disregarded as being exemplary rather than
preclusive. 530 F. Supp. at 1310.
151. 530 F. Supp. at 1313-14. "Point source" is defined in 33 U.S.c. § 1362 (Supp.
V 1981), as
any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to
any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete, fissure, container, roll
ing stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating
craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not in
clude return flows from irrigated agriculture.
Id.
152. See National Wildlife Ass'n v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291 (D.D.C. 1982),
rev'd, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
153. This conclusion stems partly from information gained by the author while
serving with the United States Department of Justice between 1978 and 1982, and partly
from court records. E.g., Letter from Alan Kirk, Acting Assistant Administrator for
Enforcement and General Counsel, EPA, to S. Leary Jones, Director, Division of Water
Quality Control, Tennessee Department of Public Health (June 23, 1973); ENVIRONMEN
TAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE CONTROL OF POLLUTION FROM HYDROGRAPHIC MODI
FICATIONS (1973); EPA, Office of General Counsel, Action Memorandum on Issuing
NPDES Permits to Dams (1978). The principal argument against regulating dams was
that the administrative burden of permitting nearly two million existing dams would be
too great.
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304(f)(2)(F) of the Clean Water Act l54 exhibits an intention by Con
gress that dams be treated as "nonpoint sources" of pollution, and
left essentially unregulated. 15s
The district court reasoned that "the statutory interpretation in
volved here does not require scientific expertise,"ls6 and thus, in
light of the agency's equivocation, the court was equally suited to the
task of dissecting the statute and ascertaining Congress's intent. IS7
The court of appeals rejected the district court's reasoning and
accorded EPA's currently-proffered position a great deal of defer
ence. 15S In its lengthy discussion on the deference notion, the court
of appeals asserted that "the standard for deference. . . 'defies gen
eralized application and demands, instead, close attention to the na
ture of the particular problem faced by the agency'."IS9 If the nature
of the problem involves "policy implications," "full deference" will
be accorded. 160 The court considered that EPA's statutory interpre
tation involved "policy implications of the point source-nonpoint
source choice," 161 and went on to analyze the statute on the narrow
question of whether EPA's interpretation was reasonable. 162
The court of appeals' distinction between policy implicated stat
utory interpretation and "narrow dissection of the language of the
154. 33 U.S.c. § 1314(f)(2)(F) (Supp. V 1981).
155. See 693 F.2d at 169. Nonpoint sources of pollution (typically agricultural or
urban run-oil) are studied, but not regulated, under the Clean Water Act. The court of
appeals ascribed this change of position to the EPA, and in a long footnote unconvinc
ingly argued that the EPA's position had been consistent all along. 693 F.2d at 168 n.36.
Compare id. at 168 n.40. What in fact happened is that the appellate attorneys in the
Justice Department were persuaded that the government had to make the section
304(f)(2)(F) argument in order to prevail. EPA water quality personnel opposed making
the argument, which they feared would result in the court's placing too broad a gloss on
the section, thereby interfering with EPA's regulation of mines and other pollution gen
erating activities whose wastewater emanates from an impoundment. However, EPA
was not the "real party in interest" in the dams case. The Corps of Engineers, which
owns many of the nation's dams, and which was a defendant in several similar cases, had
a substantial interest in prevailing over the National Wildlife Federation. It strongly
advocated that the Justice Department make all available arguments, and the Depart
ment did so.
156. 530 F. Supp. at 1311.
157. See id.
158. 693 F.2d at 169-70. This is somewhat ironic in light of the background of the
formulation of the government's position. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
159. 693 F.2d at 170 (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC,
606 F.2d 1031, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1979».
160. Id. at 170.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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Act"163 is not altogether satisfactory when viewed in light of the
"policy" issues apparently confronting EPA. Whether and how to
regulate discharges from dams under the Clean Water Act are not
questions of scientific complexity. The statutory construction issue is
straightforward-it involves construing definitions in light of reason,
common sense, and Congress's goals. The "policy" issue identified
by the court of appeals was whether to treat dams as point sources or
nonpoint sources l64-that is to say, whether to regulate or not to reg
ulate-another way of expressing the ultimate question. The "policy
choices" facing EPA in determining what position to take on the le
gal question are not terribly complex, namely, how much work
would be involved in the activity and how much would regulation
COSt.1 65 These can easily be viewed by the court as objective facts in
its ascertaining Congressional intent. They do not compel deference
to an interpretation of the statute urged by the government that
serves the government's self-interest.
In sharp contrast to the deference accorded EPA in construing
the Clean Water Act is the absence of deference accorded EPA's
construction of the Clean Air Act in the bubble case. The bubble
case involved a challenge to an EPA regulation that created what has
been euphemistically termed the "double bubble." EPA, in its initial
regulations issued to implement the 1977 amendments to the Clean
Air Act, had defined the term "stationary source" differently for the
purposes of administering Part D of the Act l66 from the way it de
fined the term "major emitting facility" in connection with Part C of
the Act. 167 Congress did not define the term "stationary source" in
163. Id. at 169.
164. Id. at 170.
165. Both the bureaucratic cost (in terms of work-years necessary to carry out the
regulatory program) and the social cost (including the cost to develop and install treat
ment technology) are more dependent upon how the EPA implements such a program
than whether the law requires it to embark on the program in the first instance. Al
though the government argued and the district court found, 530 F. Supp. at 1313, that the
exercise would be extremely costly on both counts, it is clear that EPA had a great degree
of latitude to structure the program. Even if the regulatory scheme proved very expen
sive, it would not have been the first time Congress imposed a cost without expressly
considering it in the legislative process.
166. 42 U.S.c. §§ 7501-08 (Supp. V 1981). Part D requires, inter alia, issuance of
permits, and the imposition of stringent emisson controls on new sources of air pollution
proposed to be located in areas where air quality is poorer than the federal national
ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). These are termed "nonattainment areas." Id.
167. 42 U.S.c. §§ 7470-79 (Supp. V 1981). Part C requires the imposition of per
mits, and stringent controls as part of a complex scheme to prevent the deterioration of
existing air quality in areas where air is comparatively free of pollution. Part C is called
the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program. Id.
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Part D, but it did define the term in section III of the Act,168 the
basic provision for regulating new sources of pollution. 169 It did not
define the term "major emitting facility" in Part C.
EPA defined "stationary source," for Part D purposes, to in
clude both an entire industrial plant, and each piece of equipment
that emits an air pollutant. 170 Therefore, a large industrial facility
was likely to have a number of individual "sources" of pollution,
each one of which was subject to Part D. For Part C purposes, how
ever, EPA defined "major emitting facility" only as a plant. 171 By
treating a large plant as a single source, EPA's regulation treats the
facility as if it were covered by a large "bubble." Individual points
of emission may increase or decrease, but what is important from the
regulatory standpoint is the "net emission increase from the plant as
a whole above the statutory or regulatory trip wire. . . . "172 The
"bubble" was required for protection of significant deterioration
(PSD) purposes as a result of a ruling in an earlier lawsuit construing
the Part C provisions. 173 The District of Columbia Circuit had pre
viously held that a "bubble" was impermissible under the pre-1977
"new source performance standards," section III of the Act. 174
Congress had not said anything expressly about a "bubble" for Part
D purposes, so EPA's choice not to employ the concept, but instead
adopt a "dual definition" of source for Part D purposes, constituted
an exercise of statutory interpretation on its part.
In 1981, EPA amended its regulations and made the Part D def
inition of "stationary source" in all material respects identical with
its definition of "major emitting facility" under Part C of the Clean
Air Act,175 thereby allowing the "bubble" to attach to a pollution
emitting facility for nonattainment purposes,176 as well as prevention
168. 42 U.S.c. § 7411(a)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
169. See Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
170. Requirements for Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,696-97
(1980).
171. Id. at 52,693. While we are dealing with two different terms ("stationary
source" and "major emitting facility"), their concepts are identical. Each relates to the
thing or entity that must be regulated.
172. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d at 724 n.26.
173. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
174. ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 327-30 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
175. 45 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (1980).
176. The practical effect of this action was to allow process changes within a large
industrial plant complex to avoid "new source review," and thus not be required to
achieve the "lowest achievable emission rate" (LAER) standards applicable to new
sources constructed in nonattainment areas. Critics argued that this would result in "sta
tus quo" air quality rather than constantly improving air quality, as Congress intended
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for PSD purposes. 177
The statute does not define "stationary source." The legislative
history, the court found, was" 'at best contradictory'."17s EPA ar
ticulated a rational, albeit not terribly convincing, set of policy rea
sons for its new definition,179 and its definitions did not violate any
previous ruling of the court. ISO All of these factors would, under the
rationale enunciated by the District of Columbia Circuit in the dams
case, call for deference to EPA's implementation of the Act. Yet the
court accorded not a word of deference to the agency. It struck
down the "double bubble" on the premise that EPA's definition of
"source" was inconsistent with the basic philosophy of Part D, which
addresses the improvement of air quality.lSI
The dams case and the bubble case are inconsistent in their
treatment of deference to an agency's statutory interpretation. They
are inconsistent because there are no criteria for according defer
ence. While the panel in the dams case made an effort at articulating
its reasons for according deference to EPA,IS2 those reasons are not
wholly satisfactory, and arguably do not adequately account for the
deference shown in the case. IS3
for nonattainment areas. See ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319,327-29 (D.C. Cir.
1978). The "bubble" was arguably appropriate for PSD areas, where preservation of the
status quo was the congressional goal. See 123 CONGo REc. 18,167 (1977) (remarks of
Sen. Dole): "For concentrated industrial areas [the 1977 amendments) will involve an
effort to clean up ambient air quality to the extent possible, while for relatively 'clean'
areas. . . ,the effort will involve a reasonable approach to maintaining healthy air stan
dards in the face of future development."}.
177. See Gorsuch, 685 F.2d at 725-26.
178. /d. at 726.
179. The EPA argued (I) since the change simplified its clean air program some
what, it promoted efficiency and reduced regulatory complexity, 46 Fed. Reg. at 50,767;
(2) that the change better implemented Congress's desire to give the states more flex
ibility as the primary administrators of the Act, id; and (3) the definition was not incon
sistent with the basic thrust of Part D of the Act, which basically requires a moratorium
on new construction only until the state submits to EPA a set of more stringent regula
tory controls than it had prior to 1977. Compare id with 42 U.S.c. §§ 7501-08 (Supp. V
1981); see Brief for Appellee at 33-36; Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gor
such, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
180. The court of appeals felt that it was bound to follow its previous decision in
ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1980). ASARCO, however, dealt with
section III of the Clean Air Act. The EPA argued, somewhat inartfully, that there are
differences between section III and the Act, and the Part D provisions that were suffi
cient to permit the court to ignore ASARCO. Brief for Appellee at 26-27; Natural Re
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
181. 685 F.2d at 726.
182. The court said it would defer to an agency's interpretation where the interpre
tation was based on considerations of policy. 693 F.2d at 169.
183. There are, of course, many other examples of deference and nondeference
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WHAT ROLE SHOULD DEFERENCE PLAY?

The degree of deference accorded agencies should necessarily
depend upon what the court is reviewing. In its basic fact-finding, a
regulatory agency functions in much the same way a trial judge
functions. It receives sometimes conflicting factual evidence and ex
pert opinions, and chooses among them in light of extant legal con
straints, its biases and its experience. As a fact-finder an agency is
not a totally objective tabula rosa, dispensing justice in a vacuum.
But then neither is the trial judge. A judge who has ruled on a hun
dred medical malpractice summary judgment motions, or perhaps
the better analogy, a dozen antitrust bench trials, develops substan
tial expertise. Such a judge is, under the law, entitled to no greater
fact-finding deference than the judge who has just done his or her
first such case. Appellate courts generally defer to the judge's deci
sion as to whom to believe, and so too should be the case with agen
cies. Trial judges, however, preside over adversary proceedings
whose fairness, in terms of requiring that a complete record be de
veloped, is ensured by rigid procedural safeguards not applicable to
agency "rulemaking." While a certain level of fact -finding deference
is due to agencies, the appellate courts should scrutinize the sub
stance of an informal agency record to the same degree as that of a
trial record. The nature of administrative records is such that it is
easier for contrary facts and opinions to be obscured.
In matters of scientific and technical complexity, justice would
seem better served by the courts according less deference than they
do to more mundane fact-finding. Whatever merit Judge Bazelon's
concern has that judges find it easier to scrutinize less exotic records
closely,184 there are compelling reasons for minimizing deference in
such matters. A principal concern is that there is a potential for the
development of a tyranny by bureaucrat-technicians in the absence
of strong minded judicial review. This concern would be amelio
rated if true peer review does not exist in government agencies at the
policymaking levels. ISS Moreover, relatively nontechnical policy deamong the circuit court decisions. I have chosen, however, to illustrate my point with
these two decisions because of their close temporal proximity and the fact that they ema
nate from one court.
184. See supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
185. It might be argued that scientific "advisory committees" established under
some of the environmental and health regulatory statutes fill a peer review role. Such a
committee has a limited role under the Clean Air Act, for example, critiquing EPA's
"criteria documents" that assess the health effects of various postulated concentrations of
air pollutants, and are supposed to form the basis for EPA's establishment of national
ambient air quality standards. Advisory committees also function under the Toxic Sub
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cisions are often obscured by agency lawyers who cloak the regula
tion in scientific or technical buzz words. 186 Decisions "at the
frontiers of science" 187 by regulatory agencies are not science. They
are legal and policy judgments made within the framework of a stat
ute. In reviewing agency regulations, the courts are passing judg
ment not on the work product of scientists, but on regulations
usually written by lawyers,188 effectuating decisions made by polit
ical appointees and career government managers, who have relied
upon scientific employees and consultants to aid them in under
standing the data relevant to the subject matter. Finally, health and
environmental decisions can have tremendous long-term societal
consequences, and agency policy choices are often made in a highly
antagonistic political atmosphere.1 89 These factors strongly argue
for less rather than greater judicial deference.
There is no compelling argument for much deference to an
agency's statutory interpretation under most circumstances. The
tools for ascertaining legislative intent are readily accessible to
judges. While it is easy to say that an agency acquires a day-to-day
familiarity with a statute, the significance of that fact is not readily
stances Control Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, and under several other statutes. There are several responses to this argument.
These committees are in fact only advisory bodies for the most part. They are made up
of part-time members (some from within the government, some from outside of it), and
rarely produce detailed, analytical, written advice. The regulations themselves are usu
ally formulated by agency policy makers without meaningful review by these bodies.
The way these committees are chosen also makes them more political creatures than
truly scientific ones. For an interesting look at how EPA's CASAC committee functions,
see American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1187-89 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982). One important function of rigorous judicial scrutiny might
be to assure that, where such committees exist, they play their intended role in the regula
tory process, and do not become a largely irrelevant side show.
186. Indeed, such regulatory razzle-dazzle appears to have played no small part in
the EPA's regulatory turnaround in the "bubble" case.
187. See Baltimore Gas and Electric CO. V. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2246, 2256 (1983), where the court said: ". . . [A) reviewing court must
remember that the Commission is making predictions, within its area of special expertise,
at the frontiers of science. When examining this kind of scientific determination, as op
posed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferen
tial." Id. (citations omitted).
188. At the EPA, the agency with which the author is most familiar, lawyers,
whose average age is in the late twenties, write the final drafts of all major substantive
regulations. The general counsel passes final judgment on the sufficiency of the regula
tion and the statutory authority for the rule. In a very real sense, extreme judicial defer
ence to an agency like the EPA amounts to a large degree to deference to the agency's
lawyers, whose collective experience is not overwhelming, either as a matter of science or
law.
189. See generally B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL DIRTY AIR (1981).
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apparent when what is at issue is the agency's choice of rival inter
pretations of the statute. To put the matter bluntly, EPA does not
construct "bubbles" on a routine basis. That which is routine in ad
ministering a statute seldom ends up in the courthouse. 190
The danger inherent in the current trend toward greater defer
ence to EPA and other scientific and technical agencies is ultimate
loss of the judicial check and balance over a major segment of gov
ernmental activity that has enormous social and economic signifi
cance to the citizenry. On the practical side, the absence of a
uniform rule for according deference to agency decisions is creating
a hodgepodge of irreconcilable decisions on the validity of agency
rules. At present, it is possible for identical actions to be either up
held or overturned depending upon which philosophy of deference is
followed by the court of appeals panel assigned to the case.
There is need for reform, which is most likely to be successful if
the Supreme Court were to take a long, hard look at the deference
doctrine, and lay down stern rules for the courts of appeals to follow.
That would, of course, require the Court to stem the tide of its own
deferential proclivities, and abandon its tendency of recent years to
more or less mechanically recite the deference doctrine, particularly
when confronted with technologically complex rules.
Legislative reform, I think, at least in the form proposed during
recent sessions of Congress, 191 would be less successful. These ef
forts focus on tinkering with the language of the AP A. 192 While a
stern command by the Congress may ultimately result in relative
uniformity of decision, achieving such uniformity could take years of
litigation over the meaning and scope of the command. The courts'
amalgamation of the substantial evidence-arbitrary and capricious
dichotomy into one standard of review 193 sharply illustrates that leg
islative reform must be clear and precise.

190. See also supra text accompanying notes 133-41 for a discussion of regulatory
agency participation in the legislative process.
191. See, e.g., S. 1472, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982); H.R. REP. No. 435, 97th Congo 2d Sess. (1982).
192. See, for example, H.R. 746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), and H.R. REP. No.
435, 97th Congo 2d Sess. (1982), which proposed to amend the Administrative Procedure
Act to make regulations more cost-effective, to ensure periodic review of old rules, to
improve regulatory planning and management, to eliminate needless formality and de
lay, and to enhance public participation in the regulatory process.
193. See supra note 10.
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CONCLUSION

Judicial deference to a federal agency's regulatory fact-finding,
decisionmaking and statutory construction is a custom of uncertain
judicial origin which has been embraced by the present Supreme
Court seemingly without critical analysis of its roots, its jurispruden
tial legitimacy or its significance in terms of our constitutional sys
tem of checks and balances. There is no uniformity in the way
courts have approached deference to administrative agencies, and
the result has been a hodgepodge of rule making decisions that pro
vide little in the way of guidance as to what decisionmaking stan
dards will really be applied to the agencies. The Supreme Court
seems to have slipped into a pattern of deferring to agency judg
ments without considering the long-term consequences of such a
practice.
The whole notion of deference needs to be reconsidered, and
the law clarified. My own inclination would be to narrow the prac
tice considerably, to accord deference only with respect to an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations, and as to policy choice
clearly given by Congress to the agency to make. In record review
and statutory construction cases, no special deference to an agency's
view should be given.

